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Abstract
In this report we describe an argument-based model - ProCLAIM -
for monitoring agents’ decisions in safety-critical environments intended,
on the one hand, to prevent agents from undertaking decisions that do
not comply with the established guidelines given by the domain, and on
the other hand, by enabling agents to argue over their intended decisions,
to allow agents to exceptionally undertake decisions that violate the ex-
isting guidelines when their given arguments supporting the decisions are
accepted.
Furthermore, ProCLAIM defines a Case-Based Reasoning component
intended for revising the guidelines knowledge that control the agents’
decisions. Namely, the arguments given by the agents to support their
decisions are stored in a case base and eventually reused in order to revise
the Guideline Knowledge so that it will accept new decisions shown to
be successful despite of violating the guidelines, and at the same time, to
reject decisions that in spite of being complaint with these guidelines have
shown to be unsuccessful.
We believe and aim to show in this report that ProCLAIM provides
a number of interesting theoretical innovations in artificial intelligence
which are motivated with valuable practical applications.
1 Introduction
In dealing with practical reasoning, i.e. reasoning over actions or decisions
rather than over belief, argumentation has shown to be a solid approach. How-
ever, after a few very promising argument-based systems developed during the
1990s, the continuous growth in the theoretical field of argumentation was not
accompanied with the expected increase in novel proposals in the practical field.
Currently, very few of the more appealing proposals go as deep as to solve prac-
tical problems. Usually, they only outline their possible applications with a
number of illustrative examples.
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In this report we present an argument-based model that not only introduces
a number of novelties in the theoretical field, but also, and principally, aims
to solve practical problems in scenarios as complex and sensitive as the hu-
man organ transplantation [26] or wastewater treatments plants [23]. Moreover,
we believe that the theoretical innovations are consequence of our pragmatical
approach.
The ProCLAIM model provides a setting for agents to argue over the validity
of their intended decisions in safety-critical environments. The model defines a
Mediator Agent that guides the proponent agents in their deliberation and sub-
sequently evaluates the posed arguments so as to conclude whether a proposed
decision is valid according to the existing guidelines. Exceptionally, the agents’
arguments may persuade the Mediator Agent (MA) to accept decisions that
violate the existing guidelines, encoded in a Guidelines Knowledge base (GK).
The ProCLAIM model is not only intended to control agents’ decisions but
also to revise the GK taking into account the success and failure of the un-
dertaken decisions. The agents’ arguments posed within the deliberations are
stored, some of these arguments may have been used to support decisions ac-
cepted and undertaken despite of violating the guidelines. Some of these deci-
sions may have shown to be successful. The stored arguments supporting these
successful decisions are reused for updating the GK.
A similar process takes place when incidences of wrong decisions that were
accepted as being compliant with the current guidelines are detected. An update
will be triggered on the GK in order to prevent the prevalence of such wrong
decisions.
In order to implement such model: 1 ) Agents should be able to construct
and pose arguments that reflect their reasons for undertaking their intended
decisions; 2 ) The exchanged arguments should be comprehended by the agents
proposing a decision and by the control system (the MA) so that there is ac-
tually a deliberation on whether to accept or reject the given justifications; 3 )
There must exist procedures by which agents can persuade the system for their
justifications to be accepted, in spite of violating the guidelines, and this should
be done in a controlled manner; and 4 ) There should be a mechanism to control
the success of past decisions and to revise the GK when needed.
In §3 we present the ProCLAIM model and address these requirements
needed for its implementation. To illustrate the application of the ProCLAIM
model, we introduce the human organ transplant scenario [26] framed in the
agent-based system CARREL [29], an e-institution designed to improve the
overall transplant process. The implementation of the proposed model involves
providing an environment for CARREL agents to argue over the viability of hu-
man organs available for transplantation. In doing so, we believe there is a po-
tential to increase the number of human organs that current selection processes
make available for transplantation, and consequently, help to reduce the increas-
ing gap between demand for and supply of human organs for transplantation
[12].
Broadly speaking, the ProCLAIM model relays on the use of argument
schemes and critical questions to define the contextual deliberative scenario
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[25]. This body of schemes provides guidance to the arguing agents in their rea-
soning [15] and in their interaction [27]. Some of the argument schemes embody
reasons for exceptionally validating intended decisions that in normal situation
would be rejected (for example, in the human organ transplant scenario, by
arguing that a recipient is in a precarious condition an agent can claim that
an organ from a donor who had hepatitis C virus (HCV), is viable and there-
fore can be transplanted despite of causing a HCV infection on the recipient).
Another reason for exceptionally validating a decision is the source from which
(or where) the justification is given, such as the agent’s role or reputation, or
that particular arguments are accompanied by a certificate, or reference, that
empower an agent to undertake this exceptional decision.
To keep record of previous resolved experiences and their success, the Pro-
CLAIM model makes use of Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) [11]. We proposed
such use of CBR in [28], in which the agents’ submitted arguments are evalu-
ated on the basis of previous resolved experiences to detect whether there exists
precedence of the use of such arguments, in similar situations, and whether their
use was appropriate, successful, in these previous experiences. This allows the
acceptance of arguments that despite of violating the guidelines proved to be
successful in their application. Also, it allows to detect the unsatisfactory use of
arguments that comply with the existing guidelines. These two situations will
trigger an update on the GK.
In the following section we introduce the human organ transplant scenario
that will illustrate the application of the ProCLAIM model which we describe
in detail in §3. And finally, In §4 we give our conclusions.
2 Arguing Over the Viability of a Human Organ
for Transplantation
Human organ transplantation constitutes the only effective therapy for many
life-threatening diseases. However, while the increasing success of transplants
has led to increase in demand, the lack of a concomitant increase in donor organ
availability has led to a growing disparity between supply and demand. Hence,
much research has focussed on definition and implementation of policies for in-
creasing donor availability, identification of suitable recipients for organs, and
procedures to increase the chances of successful transplantation. Furthermore,
the scarcity of donors has led to the creation of national and international coali-
tions of transplant organizations. This has resulted in requirements for man-
aging and processing vast and complex data, and accommodation of a complex
set of, in some cases conflicting, national and international regulations and pro-
tocols governing exchange of organs and tissues. Hence, in [29] an agent-based
architecture - CARREL - is proposed for managing the data to be processed in
carrying out recipient selection, organ and tissue allocation, ensuring adherence
to legislation, and following approved protocols and preparing delivery plans.
The problem that concerns us here relates to the fact that, despite the grow-
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ing disparity between demand and supply of organs, a great percentage of human
organs available for transplantation are discarded as being deemed non-viable
for that purpose. Currently, much effort is devoted in order to reduce discards
by extending the criteria for the acceptability of human organs (e.g. [12, 3, 4],
among many others). Although sometimes pointing out some new contraindica-
tions for transplanting an organ, in general, in these works researchers challenge
many of the established criteria for discarding human organs; to then argue,
providing strong evidence, that these criteria are not valid. That they do dot
constitute a justification to deem an organ as non-viable. This strongly suggest
that not all medical doctors agree upon what constitute a reason for deeming
an organ as viable or non-viable.
This fact is not taken into account in the current human organ selection
precess, in which the agent in charge of offering the available organ, offers for
transplantation only the organs he or she believes to be viable. This prevents
other agents, in particular the medical doctors responsible of the recipients, from
having the chance to claim the organ as viable and thus, eventually attempt to
make use of it. In §2.3 we propose a new selection process in which agents can
argue over the viability of a human organ and, in that way, ensure that if an or-
gan is deemed non-viable, it is because all the stakeholders concluded the organ
to be non-viable, or that the arguments for viability were not strong enough.
Given the sensitivity of the decision to be taken, the arguments given by the
agents should comply with the known guidelines, i.e. the human organ accept-
ability criteria. Nevertheless, as above shown, sometimes arguments should be
accepted despite of not being compliment with the acceptability criteria. More-
over, we claim that the exchanged arguments among the agents are of great
value, since they represent the experts understanding of the problem at hand.
Hence, these arguments can be stored and reused, for example by a Case-Based
Reasoning component, in order to refine the human organ acceptability crite-
ria. Namely, our intention is to provide an environment in which more organs
can safely be accepted; and we claim that this can be done by applying the
ProCLAIM model in CARREL in the way we now describe.
In the following section we briefly describe CARREL on the light of our
problem. Then, in §2.2 we describe the current human organ selection process
highlighting what we believe are its problematic aspects. Finally in §2.3 we
propose an alternative selection process and outline the application of the Pro-
CLAIM model in CARREL. The formalization of such application is further
developed in §3.
2.1 The CARREL Agent Based System
Since 1980 the number of transplant requests has been constantly increasing. As
a consequence, the human transplant coordinators are currently facing signifi-
cant problems in dealing with the volume of work involved in the management of
requests, assignation and distribution of tissues and organs. Given the constat
progress in transplant-based therapies and the relative success of these thera-
pies, the demand for organs and tissues are expected to raise even more. A
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review of the coordinator’s role and the difficulties faced is presented in [13].
Furthermore, the scarcity of donors has led to the creation of national and
international coalitions of transplant organizations in an attempt to reduce the
disparity between demand for and supply of human tissue and organs. This
has resulted in having to manage and process vast and complex data, as well
as having to deal with a complex set of, in some cases conflicting, national and
international regulations and protocols governing exchange of organs and tissues.
Thus, with the purpose of managing the data to be processed in carrying out
recipient selection, organ and tissue allocation, ensuring adherence to legislation,
and following approved protocols and preparing delivery plans, CARREL [29],
an agent-based architecture is proposed.
Encoded in CARREL are sets of legislation and protocols governing the
exchange of organs and tissues. These are based on two physical institutions
representing examples of best practice: the OCATT (Organitzacio´ CATalana de
Trasplantaments) [17] and ONT (Organizacio´n Nacional de Transplantes) [18]
organ transplantation organizations for Catalonia and Spain respectively. The
Spanish organizational model has two levels of action:
Intra-hospital: Where the role of hospital Transplant Coordinator was created
to improve the coordination of all the people working at any step of the
donor procurement, allocation and transplantation process.
Inter-hospital: Where the intermediary organizations OCATT for Catalonia
and ONT for the whole of Spain, were created to improve the commu-
nication and coordination of all the participating health-care transplant
organizations, namely hospitals and tissue banks.
Figure 1 depicts the inter-hospital level managed by CARREL in which we
can identify the entities that interact with the CARREL system. Each TB
denotes a tissue bank, each UCTx denotes a transplant coordination unit, the
agency that represent a hospital member of CARREL. The ONT and OCATT
denote the organ transplantation organizations that own the agent platform and
act as observers.
The role of the CARREL Institution can be summarized in terms of following
tasks:
T1 to make sure that all the agents which enter into institution behave properly
(that is, that they follow the behavioral norms).
T2 to be up to date about all the available pieces in the Tissue Banks, and all
the recipients that are registered in the waiting lists.
T3 to check that all hospitals and tissue banks fulfill all the requirements needed
to interact with CARREL.
T4 to take care of the fulfillment of the commitments undertaken inside the
CARREL system.
T5 to coordinate the piece delivery from one facility to another.
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T6 to register all incidents relating to a particular piece.
A hospital becomes a member of the CARREL institution in order to make
use of the services provided. In doing so, they accept to respect the norms that
rule the interaction inside CARREL. Some of these norms are:
N1 All organ offers and tissue requests should be done through the CARREL in-
stitution.
N2 Hospitals must accept the outcomes of the negotiation (assignation) process.
N3 Hospitals receiving an organ or tissue from CARREL must update the in-
stitution with any relevant event related to these organs and tissues.
Hospitals 
without a
Tissue Bank (TB)
Hospitals (UCTx)
with TB
Figure 1: CARREL: An Agent Mediated Organization for Tissue and Organ
Allocation.
Each hospital member of CARREL is represented by the Transplant Coor-
dination Unit (UCTx) that manages the intra-hospital level. Each UCTx goal
is to successfully culminate any organ and tissue procurement, extraction and
implantation process. Each UCTx is modelled as an agency, the roles the dif-
ferent agents play in this agency is presented in [8]. We will identify two agents
in the UCTx agency and describe their role in the light of the organ discarding
process. The Donor Agent (DAx) is the agent representing the transplant coor-
dinator of a UCTx. The transplant coordinator is responsible of procuring and
offering the organs of the potential donors. Based on the potential donor’s med-
ical history and tests, the transplant coordinator must determine which organs
are viable and which are non-viable for transplantation. The Recipient Agent
(RAx)1 is the agent representing the transplant unit (the surgeons), they are
responsible of the potential recipients and their duty is to extract the organs
from the donors and successfully transplant them to their patients.
1Initially, in [26] and [7], the Donor Agent and the Recipient Agent were named Transplant
Coordinator Agent (TCA) and Transplant Unit Agent (TUA). But following the suggestion
of an anonymous reviewer, we renamed the agents for readability purposes.
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2.2 The Human Organ Selection Process
The current human organ selection process begins when a transplant coordina-
tor, DAi (Donor Agent of UCTi)2, detects a potential donor, in which case,
after properly analyzing his characteristics, she informs the OCATT, assuming
the DAi is located in Catalonia, about the organs she considers viable for trans-
plantation. If the DAi is aware of any potential recipient that could match one
of the donor’s organs, she may consult or even delegate that decision to the pro-
fessionals in the transplant unit, RAi (Recipient Agent of UCTi), responsible
of that potential recipient. This should be done before informing the OCATT
and it normally happens when the recipient and the donor are located in the
same hospital. If the DAi deemed the organ as viable but no match for the
organ is found among the potential recipients in the waiting lists of Catalonia,
the OCATT will offer the organ to the ONT. Otherwise, if a recipient is found,
the allocation process takes place and the organ is offered to a Catalan DAi
that may or may not accept the organ3. If refused, the organ will be offered
to a different RAj′ until final acceptance or refusal. The RAj that accepts the
organ has the right to discard it after or during the extraction operation, in
which case it is very unlikely to have the organ transplanted. If no RAj accepts
the organ, it is offered to the ONT.
When an organ is offered to the ONT, a similar process takes place, this
time however embracing Spain and not only Catalonia. In case of refusal, the
ONT will offer the organ to transplant organizations in Europe through the
OCATT.4 If these organizations refuse the organ, the OCATT will then offer it
in Asia. However, this last step hardly ever occurs. If every organization fails
to allocate the organ, the organ will not be retrieved from the donor.
In 2005, in Catalonia, a world leader in transplantation, between 15 and 20
% of the livers, 20% of the kidneys, 60% of the hearts, 85% of the lungs and
95% of the pancreas, from donors that were detected, are discarded.
The problem is that this process does not account for the fact that medical
doctors may disagree as to whether an organ is viable or non-viable, and that
different policies in different hospitals and regions exist. Furthermore, human
organs are rarely non-viable or ideal per se. The term ideal organ should imply
an integral concept that involves donor and recipient characteristics and all the
procedure performances between both [12].
2For readability purpose we make no distinction now between the software agent and the
human agent. In §3.2.3 we discuss the interaction of the human agent with the extended
CARREL.
3It is worth mentioning that at this stage the offered organ has not yet been extracted. It
is after accepting it that a RAj (Transplant Unit) may extract the organ from the donor.
4OCATT acts as international relation office for the ONT.
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Potential DonorPotential DonorPotential Donor
Allocation
Process
ONT
Refuse When Offered All the TU Refused the Organ
Discard
Transplant Coordinator
OCATT
Detected
Transplant
Transplant Unit Transplant UnitTransplant Unit Transplant Unit
Offer
Discard Transplant
Offer
An organ will be offered to only one Transpnat Unit at a time. If they refuse the
organ, it will then be offered to the following Transplant Unit.
viable organ
non-viable
organ
Transplant Unit
consult or delegate
Figure 2: Flow of the Current Organ Discard Process.
2.3 Applying ProCLAIM on CARREL
2.3.1 Extending CARREL
From the design point of view, CARREL can be defined as a type of dialogical
system where all the interactions are compositions of message exchanges, or
illocutions, structured through agent group meetings called scenes or rooms.
Each agent can be associated with one or more roles, and these roles define
the rooms the agent can enter and the protocols it should follow. Briefly, for
CARREL to support the proposed process, the roles of the DAis and RAjs have
been extended to include construction, sending and retrieving of arguments.
The role of the mediator agent (MA) was defined with the tasks of constructing
further arguments, assigning strengths to arguments and evaluating the status
of interacting arguments. In addition, two new scenes or rooms were defined: a
Transplant Organization Room (TOR) and an Evaluation Room (ER).
2.3.2 A New Human Organ Selection Process
The organ selection process illustrates the ubiquity of disagreement and conflict
of opinion in the medical domain. What may be a sufficient reason for discard-
ing an organ for some qualified professionals may not be for others. Different
policies in different hospitals and regions exist, and a consensus among medical
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professionals is not always feasible. Contradictory conclusions may be derived
from the same set of facts. For example, suppose a donor with a smoking
history of more than 20-30 packs a year and no history of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD). Some would cite a donor’s smoking history as suf-
ficient reason for labelling a donor’s lung as non-viable [18]. However, there
are qualified physicians that reason that the donor’s lung is viable given that
there is no history of COPD [12]. Similarly, some would discard the kidney of
a donor whose cause of death was streptococcus viridans endocarditis (sve)[18].
But again, some reason that by administrating penicillin to the recipient the
kidney can safely be transplanted [4].
Hence, it may be the case that although a DAi may argue that an organ is
non-viable, a RAj can provide a stronger argument for considering the organ
as viable. On the other hand, a DAi may argue that an organ is viable, and
this argument may be stronger than a RAj ’s argument for non-viability. We
believe that by enabling agents to argue over the viability of a human organ the
number of discarded organs can be safely reduced.
UCTX
UCT2
UCT1
UCT3
OA
ONT
OCATT
CARREL
Transplant Organization Room
Evaluation Room
MA
OA
MA
Transplant Coordinator Agent
Mediator Agent
TCA2
TCA3
TCAX
TCA1
TUA1
TUA2
TUA3
TUAX
TCA1
TCA1 TUAj
TCAX
OA OCATT Agent (or another Transplant Organization Agent)
Transplant Unit AgentTUAX
Figure 3: The proposed Human Organ Selection Process Managed by CARREL
Figure 3 sketches the CARREL system managing the proposed process. This
figure depicts the DA1 of UCT1 that, having identified a potential donor, en-
ters the TOR and communicates basic data (e.g., organ type and donor clinical
history) to the OA representing the transplant organizations (e.g., OCATT or
ONT). DA1 also sends his arguments supporting his believes over the organ via-
bility to theMA in the ER. The OA contacts each RAj identified as a potential
recipient on the basis of the basic organ and donor data. Each contacted RAj
then constructs its own arguments for either the viability or non-viability of the
organ, and communicates these arguments to the MA. In the case that some
RAj and DA1 disagree as to the viability of the organ, MA mediates further
submission of arguments by RAj and DA1 and then evaluates the dialectical
status of the submitted arguments in order to determine the winning argument,
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and so decide whether the organ is viable or not for RAj .
Case 1: The organ considered as Viable by the DAi
Case 2: The organ considered as Non-Viable by the DAi
Part of the process in which the agents deliberate over the viability of the offered organ
V: Organ labelled as Viable
N: Organ labelled as Non-Viable
Transplant Unit
Potential DonorPotential Donor
Donor Agent
Allocation
Process
Transplant Unit
Transplant Unit Transplant UnitTransplant Unit Transplant Unit
Transplant UnitRecipient Agent Recipient Agent Recipient Agent
Recipient Agent Recipient Agent Recipient Agent Recipient Agent
Recipi t Recipi t
Recipi t Recipi t Recipi t Recipi t
All the RA refused the Organ when offered
or labelled it as non-viable
Recipient Agent Recipi t
Figure 4: Flow of the Proposed Human Organ Discard Process.
In [15] we take this to be a three step process, in which the DA1 poses his
arguments, then a RAj counterargues and finally the MA evaluates the given
arguments. However, in [27] this process is taken as a three party dialog. From
the theoretical point of view we address both options in §3.
The arguments thus far submitted are described as phase 1 arguments. If
an offered organ is deemed viable and offered to RAj , the organ is extracted.
At this time, new evidence may indicate that the organ is in fact non-viable,
and the organ is then discarded. In that case, the RAj is obliged to provide
CARREL with the new arguments (capturing the new evidence) as to why
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the organ is non-viable. These are referred to as phase 2 (post-extraction/pre-
transplantation) arguments. If complications arise after transplantation, then
RAj provides CARREL with arguments justifying (explaining) how the com-
plications resulted in failure (eventually making the organ non-viable), or, con-
versely, arguments explaining how the complications were overcome so as to
result in a successful transplant (eventually making the organ viable). These
are referred to as phase 3 (post-transplant) arguments.
Currently, we have not yet formalized the arguments of phase 2 and 3, that
although necessary for the implementation of the Case Based Reasoning Engine,
(see §3.4) are not crucial for introducing the ProCLAIM model.
3 The ProCLAIM Model
In this section we introduce the ProCLAIM argument-based model for moni-
toring decisions and revising the established guidelines in safety-related envi-
ronments. Although our goal is for ProCLAIM to be defined as a context-free
model (within the scope to which the model is intended), at the current state of
the research we can only present it as an application to the transplant scenario
introduced in §2. Nevertheless, we intend in our presentation to abstract as
much as possible the main aspects of the model to provide a sense of generality.
Broadly construed, ProCLAIM consists of a mediator agent MA directing
the proponent agents, or a single agent in a collaborative decision making, in
which the final decision must comply with certain guidelines given by the sce-
nario. In our case, these guidelines consist of the human organ acceptability
criteria encoded in the Acceptability Criteria Knowledge Base (ACKB). The
decision is taken on the basis of the agents’ given arguments. Finally, these
arguments may eventually update the GK instantiated by the ACKB in the
transplant scenario.
The MA has three main tasks: 1) Direct the arguing agents on what are
their dialectical possible moves at each stage of the deliberation; 2) Ensure
that the submitted arguments comply with the given guidelines and that no
important fact is left unmentioned (e.g. If a donor had Hepatitis C, condition
known to be a contraindication for donating an organ, and no argument refers
to that fact, the MA will submit an argument that does refers to it. This
does not necessarily implies that the organ will be deemed non-viable, there
may be a counterargument); finally, 3) MA has to assign strengths to the given
arguments and possibly pose additional arguments to then evaluate them in
order to identify the winning arguments and thus, come to a final decision.
In order to undertake these tasks, the MA makes use of four knowledge
resources:
Argument Scheme Repository: In order to direct the proponent agents in
their deliberation the MA makes use of a repository of argument schemes
and their associated critical questions formalized in a way that it defines
a protocol based exchange of arguments (see §3.2).
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Figure 5: ProCLAIM’s Architecture
Guidelines Knowledge: This component enables the MA to check whether
the arguments comply with the existing guidelines. As such it is also
referred by the MA for its argument construction. Also, it may encode
a partial ordering between the arguments/guidelines that can serve for
prioritizing arguments.
Case-Based Reasoning Engine: This component enables the MA to assign
strengths to the submitted arguments on the basis of their associated
evidence as well as providing addintional arguments deemed relevant in
previous similar deliberations. This component also triggers the updates
on the GK.
Argument Source Manager: Depending on the source from whom, or where,
the arguments are submitted, the strengths of these arguments may be
readjusted by the MA. Thus, this component manages the knowledge
related to the agents’ roles and/or reputations, and/or the types of cer-
tificates, or references, that may empower agents to undertake some ex-
ceptional decision.
In the next section we describe the formalization for the agents to reason
about the arguments to submit and about the arguments they receive. Al-
though, given the sensitivity of the decisions to be taken, fully automated agents
may not be desirable (though this may be debatable), this capability will cer-
tainly enable these agents to provide qualitatively a much better support to
the end users (see §3.2.3). In §3.2 we address the many roles of the Argument
Schemes and their associated Critical Questions. In §3.3 we define the MA’s
argument evaluation process, and finally, in §3.4 we discuss the role of the Case-
Based Reasoning Engine (CBRe) as an evaluator of the arguments evidential
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support.
3.1 An Argumentation System for Reasoning
An Argumentation System has, although sometimes implicitly: 1) an underly-
ing logical language, 2) a definitions of an argument 3) the notion of conflict
between arguments, 4) a notion of defeat5 among arguments and, 5) an account
of the acceptability status of an argument [21]. When the underlying logical lan-
guage is left unspecified the ‘system’ is no longer a system but a framework that
can be instantiated with various alternative logics to then become an argumen-
tation system. Such is the case of Dung’s framework [9] in which arguments are
taken as primitives, their internal structure is left completely unspecified, and
the focus is exclusively on the arguments’ interaction. This freedom given by
Dung’s framework to specify the arguments’ internal structure has enabled us
to define two argumentation systems within the same framework. One meant
for agents to reason [15] and another for the MA to evaluate the submitted
arguments [27]. Let us call them, Reasoning Argumentation System and Di-
alectical Argumentation System respectively. In the former it is reasonable to
have agents that, by using their particular knowledge about the domain, com-
bine rules and facts to construct the arguments that reflect their belief about
the problem. The latter, on the other hand, involves validating the submit-
ted arguments against an existing set of guidelines, thus, a less subjective and
flexible account of the validity of the arguments is required.
Nonetheless, the internal structure of the arguments of the Dialectical Sys-
tem and the notion of defeat among arguments are defined on the basis of
the Reasoning Argumentation System’s definition. In this section we cover the
agents’ argument-based reasoning and in §3.2.1 we address the Dialectical Ar-
gumentation System.
3.1.1 The Underlying Logical Language and a Definition of an Ar-
gument
The agents’ inference of arguments is built from a first order logic-programming
style language L in which well formed formulae are atomic first order formulae
or such formulae preceded by strong negation ¬ or a weak negation6 ∼ . Let us
call such formulae strong and weak literals respectively. An agent’s knowledge
base ∆ consists of the union of a set K of ground strong literals and a set R of
defeasible rules also written in L. The antecedent of such a rule is built from a
conjunction of strong literals and/or weak literals of the form ∼ L, where L is
a strong literal and ∼ represents weak negation, i.e., L cannot be shown to be
true (negation as failure).
5An argument A is said to defeat another argument B if it not only attacks B but it also
succeeds in its attack.
6Weak negation, or negation as failure ,is an interpretation of logical negation according
to which the negation of a formula is true if and only if the formula cannot be proved true.
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Definition 1 A defeasible rule is of the form:
1) L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lm ⇒ Lm+1, or
2) L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lm ⇒ ¬R
where Lm+1 is a strong literal, each Li (0 ≤ i ≤ m) is either a strong or a weak
literal and R is a rule of type 1) or 2).
An example of a rule of type 1) is p(X)∧ ∼ ¬q(X) ⇒ s(X). Note that a rule
of type 2) with consequent ¬R represents a challenge to any inference obtained
by application of R. For instance, r(X) ⇒ ¬(p(X)∧ ∼ ¬q(X) ⇒ s(X)) and
t(X) ⇒ ¬(r(X) ⇒ ¬(p(X)∧ ∼ ¬q(X) ⇒ s(X))). The rationale for these non-
standard rules with (possibly nested) negations of rules as consequents, will be
discussed in §3.1.2. In the following definition of argument inference we write
Θ(α) to denote the application of a substitution Θ = {X1/t1, . . . Xn/tn} to a
first order formula or rule α, where Xi are the variables in α and ti are terms
(constants or variables).
Definition 2 Let ∆ = (K ∪ R) be an agent’s knowledge base and α denote a
strong literal, or an expression of the form R or ¬R where R is a defeasible
rule. Then:
• ∆ |∼ α if and only if
– α ∈ ∆, or
– there exists a rule r = L1 ∧ ... ∧ Ln ⇒ α′ ∈ R, and a substitution Θ
= {X1/t1, . . . Xn/tn} on r such that α = Θ(α′), and for i = 1...n,
∆ ` Θ(Li) where each variable in Θ(Li) is assumed existentially
quantified
• ∆ |∼ ∼ L if and only if it is not the case that ∆ |∼ L
Definition 3 An argument based on ∆ = (K ∪R) is a tuple (H,h) where:
• H ⊆ ∆
• H |∼ h
• H is minimal w.r.t set inclusion (¬∃H ′ | H ′ ⊆ H and H ′ |∼ h)
The above defines the standard support-claim structuring of an argument in-
troduced by Loui and Simari [24] in which H is the support and h the claim of
argument (H,h). A sub-argument of (H,h) is of the form (H ′, h′) where H ′ is
a subset of H. From hereon we assume R in ∆ to be finite, in which case the
arguments inferred from ∆ will be finite (up to renaming of variables). Also,
we use upper case letters to denote variables and lower case letters to denote
constants. Note that by definition, each rule R ∈ R is the claim of an argument
({R}, R), and if ¬R is the consequent of a rule R′ whose antecedent can be
inferred from ∆, then R′ will be in the support of an argument with claim ¬R
({R′},¬R).
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Let us now consider the two agents, DAi and RAj that construct conflicting
arguments from the same facts. Let the DAi believe that a lung of a donor who
had a smoking history is not viable, despite of the fact that the donor had no
COPD, and let the RAj believe that smoking history is a not contraindication
given that the donor did not have COPD.
Example 1 Let r be a potential recipient for the donor d’s lung. Let d p
stand for ‘donor property’, d o for ‘donor organ’ s h for ‘smoking history’, copd
for ’chronic obstructive pulmonary disease’, v for ‘viable’ and contra for ‘con-
traindication’. Suppose DAi’s knowledge base ∆d containing:
d1 = d o(d, lung)
d2 = d p(d, s h)
d3 = ¬d p(d, copd)
d4 = d o(D, lung) ∧ d p(D, s h)⇒ contra(D, lung)
d5 = contra(D,O)⇒ ¬v(D,O)
and the recipient agent’s knowledge base ∆r containing:
r1 = d o(d, lung)
r2 = d p(d, s h)
r3 = ¬d p(d1, copd)
r4 = match(d, r)
r5 = ¬d p(D, copd) ⇒ ¬(d o(D, lung) ∧ d p(D, s h)⇒ contra(D, lung))
r6 = d o(D,O) ∧match(D,R)∧ ∼ contra(R,O)⇒ v(D,O)
From ∆d one can construct arguments:
- A1 = ({d4, d1}, d o(d, lung) ∧ d p(d, s h)⇒ contra(d, lung))
- A2 = ({d1, d2, d4}, contra(d, lung))
- A3 = ({d1, d2, d4, d5}, ¬v(d, lung))
and from ∆r the arguments:
- B1 = ({r3, r5},¬(d o(d, lung) ∧ d p(d, s h)⇒ contra(d, lung)))
- B2 = ({r1, r4, r6}, v(d, lung))
Notice that we do not formulate r5 as d o(D, lung)∧d p(D, s h)∧¬d p(D, copd)
⇒
¬contra(D, lung), as this would result in aRAj ’s argument for ¬ contra(d, lung)
which would challenge any DAi’s argument for contra(d, lung), and not just
DAi’s arguments constructed on the basis of the donor’s smoking history. That
is, B1 represents a possible challenge to any argument for contra(d, lung) con-
structed using d4.
3.1.2 Defining Defeat among Arguments and Evaluating the Status
of Arguments
We now define the binary relation of defeat on pairs of conflicting arguments.
This relation also accounts for a relative valuation of arguments encoded as a
partial ordering.
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Definition 4 Let AR be the set of arguments {(H1, h1) . . . (Hn, hn)} inferred
from a knowledge base ∆, and ¹ a partial ordering on AR. Then Defeat ⊆
(AR × AR) where ((H,h), (H ′, h′)) ∈ Defeat iff there exists a sub-argument
(G, g) of (H,h) and a sub-argument (G′, g′) of (H ′, h′) such that:
• there exists a L1 ∧ ... ∧ Ln ⇒ α ∈ G′ such that for some i, Li = ∼ g. In
this case we say that (H,h) undercut defeats (H ′, h′)
• g ≡ ¬g′, and it is not the case that (H ′, h′) Â (H,h) or that (H ′, h′) un-
dercut defeats (H,h). In this case we say that (H,h) rebut defeats (H ′, h′)
Note that rebut defeats can be symmetrical in the absence of a partial order
on AR, or when the rebutting arguments have equal strength. Note also the
special case of rebut defeats between arguments with claims R and ¬R where
R is a defeasible rule. These are related to the notion of a Pollock undercut
defeat [19]: an argument A = (H, ¬R) denies the relation between premises
and conclusion of the defeasible rule R used in argument B, and thus undercut
defeats B if A º B. However, if A ≺ B then neither argument defeats each
other and so both can inappropriately co-exist in a conflict free set of argu-
ments. One solution is to say that A’s undercut defeat on B always succeeds
(irrespective of their relative strength). This is the approach that is effectively
adopted in other logic programming based approaches such as in Prakken and
Sartor [20] whereby a Pollock’s undercut is simulated by an argument A with
claim ¬applicable R(X) undercut defeating B by disproving the non-provability
assumption ∼ ¬applicable R(X) in the antecedent of B’s rule R.
Our approach is to change the nature of the attack from an undercut to a
rebut, so as to allow for the rule R to ‘repel’ and indeed defeat it’s attacker ¬R.
It is partly for this reason that rules and negations of rules can be the claims
of arguments in our formalism 7. Example 1 illustrates our motivation. We not
only want that the recipient’s argument B1 can defeat a donor’s argument that
has A1 as one of its sub-arguments, but also that such argument can defeat
B1 (see fig 6a. Note that A1 is a sub-argument of A2 and A3). Hence, we
do not include ∼ ¬d p(D, copd) as an exception in the antecedent of d4 as this
would preclude construction of the DAi’s argument A3 for non-viability and its
subsequent possible evaluation as a wining argument over B2.
Let us now introduce a second example in which a DAi reasons whether a
kidney of a donor d whose cause of death was a streptococcus viridans endo-
carditis (sve) is viable. Let us suppose that the DAi is aware that sve is a
contraindication for donating this kidney and that the reason for being a con-
traindication is that, if transplanted to a recipient r, the recipient would end up
having an infection of that same bacteria, i.e. a streptococcus viridans infection
7Also, it seems quite reasonable to us that a rule or its negation is the claim of an argument
- “I would argue that if X and Y are the case then Z is the case” or more in the context. While
one medical doctor may argue that, “if a kidney of an elderly donor is to be transplanted it will
result in a graft failure”. Another medical doctor may argue that, “if the kidney’s structure
and functionality are OK, it is not the case that ‘if this kidney of an elderly donor is to be
transplanted it will result in a graft failure”.
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A1
({d4,d1},d_o(d, lung)    d_p(d,s_h)       contra(d, lung))
B1
({r3,r5},‹ (d_o(d, lung)    d_p(d,s_h)       contra(d, lung)))
B2
({r1,r4,r6},v(d, lung))
A2
({d1,d2,d4},contra(d, lung))
A3
({d1,d2,d4,d5},‹ v(d, lung))
rebut defeat
rebut defeat
undercut defeat
A1
({d1,d2,d6},‹ (d_o(d, kidney)    d_p(d,sve)       results_r_p(R,svi))
A2
({d1,d2,d3,d4,d5},contra(d, kidney))
A4
({d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d7},‹ viable(d, kidney))
undercut defeat
A3
({d1,d8},v(d, kidney))
B1
({H},‹ plan_action(r,penicillin))
undercut defeat
rebut defeat
rebut defeat
a) b)
Defeat Relation   (A               B;   A defeats B) 
Figure 6: a) Argument Graph illustrating example 1 in the absence of a pref-
erence relation b) Argument Graph illustrating example 2 in the absence of a
preference relation.
(svi), which is harmful. But let us also suppose that the DAi also believes that
by administrating the right antibiotic to the recipient, in this case penicillin,
the infection can be prevented [4].
Example 2 Let d p stand for ‘donor property’, d o for ‘donor organ’, results r p
for ‘results in recipient property’, plan action for ’intended course of action’, v
for ‘viable’ and contra for ‘contraindication’.
Suppose DAi’s knowledge base ∆d containing:
d1 = d o(d, kidney)
d2 = d p(d, sve)
d3 =d o(D,O) ∧ d p(D, sve)⇒ results r p(R, svi)
d4 = harmful(svi)
d5 = d o(D,O) ∧ results r p(D,C) ∧ harmful(C) ⇒ contra(D,O)
d6 = ∼ ¬plan action(R, penicillin) ⇒ ¬( d o(D, kidney) ∧ d p(D, sve) ⇒
results r p(R, svi))
d7 = contra(D,O)⇒ ¬v(D,O)
d8 = d o(D,O)∧ ∼ ¬match(D,R)∧ ∼ contra(R,O)⇒ v(D,O)
The defeasible rule d6, refers to: unless, it is not intended to administer peni-
cillin to the recipient, sve does not imply svi on the recipient.
From ∆d one can construct arguments:
- A1 = ({d1, d2, d6}, ¬( d o(d, kidney) ∧ d p(d, sve)⇒ results r p(R, svi)))
- A2 = ({d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, contra(d, kidney))
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- A3 = ({d1, d8}, v(d, kidney))
- A4 = ({d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d7}, ¬v(d, kidney))
Thus, in constructing arguments A1, A2 and A3 the DAi would acknowledge
that sve is a contraindication, if it is not intended to administer penicillin to
the recipient. This will enable a RAj, for instance, to construct an argument
for non-viability by reasoning that he does not intend to administer penicillin
to the recipient because, for example, the recipient is allergic to this antibiotic.
In this example, it is reasonable to assume that the DAi would prefer ar-
gument A1 to argument A2 (A1 Â A2), since DAi believes that penicillin can
actually prevents the infection on the recipient. Hence, in that case, A1 would
asymmetrically rebut defeats A2, preventing the undercut defeat of A2 on A3,
(A1 defends A3 from A2). And since A2 is a sub-argument of A4, A1 would
rebut defeats A4. This, intuitively, leads to presume that DAi’s winning argu-
ments are A1 and A3. Namely, that DAi believes the organ to be viable.
Note, however, that an argument B1 = ({H},¬plan action(r, penicillin))
constructed by a RAj claiming his intention to not administer penicillin would
undercut defeat A1 and thus, the winning arguments would appear to be A2,
A4 and B1 (see fig. 6b).
We now give a more formal account for determining the winning arguments.
We employ Dung’s seminal ‘calculus of opposition’ [9] to determine the preferred
arguments from an argumentation framework (AR,Defeat). Firstly, we give
Dung’s definition of a preferred extension:
Definition 5 AnArgumentation Framework is a pair AF =< AR,Defeat >,
where AR is a set of arguments, and attack is a binary relation on AR.
Let S ⊆ AR be a set of arguments, and A,B,C ∈ AR:
• S is conflict-free if there are no arguments A,B ∈ S such that A attacks
B.
• S attacks an argument A if there exists an argument B ∈ S such that B
attacks A.
• If an argument A is attacked by B which itself is attacked by an argument
C, we say that C defends A from B. Thus, we say that S defends an
argument A if for every argument B attacking A there exist an argument
C ∈ S such that C attacks B.
In example 2 the sets S1 = {A1, A3} and S2 = {A2, A4} are conflict free and S1
defends A3 (from A2 and A4), see figure 6b). In fact S1 and S2 are the maximal
conflict-free sets, with respect to the inclusion. We are not taking into account
argument B1.
Definition 6 Let S ⊆ AR be a set of arguments :
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• An argument A ∈ AR is acceptable w.r.t. S if and only if each argument
attacking A is defeated by S.
• A conflict-free set of arguments S is admissible if and only if each argu-
ment in S is acceptable with respect to S.
• A conflict-free set of arguments S is a preferred extension if and only
if it is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set.
Definition 7 Let S1, . . . , Sn be the sets of all preferred extensions of (AR, attack).
Then
⋂n
i=1 Si is the set of preferred arguments of AF .
If we assume no preference relation between arguments, examples 1 and 28 have
two preferred extensions: {A1, A2, A3} and {B1, B2} in the smoking history
example and {A1, A3}, {A2, A4} in the endocarditis example. In both cases the
intersection of these sets is empty, thus, there are no preferred arguments, i.e.
there are no winning arguments in the absence of the preference relation. We
already showed in the endocarditis example that this can be solved by priori-
tizing one argument over another or by the posing of an additional argument.
Namely, by introducing the preference relation A1 Â A2 we can conclude that
{A1, A3} is the only preferred extension, or by introducing RAj ’s argument
B1, the only preferred extension would be {A2, A4, B1}. Thus, in the first case
A1 and A3 are the preferred arguments, i.e. the winning arguments, and in the
latter, A2, A4 and B1 are the preferred arguments.
Prioritizing one argument over another in the smoking history example is
of a different nature than prioritizing arguments in the endocarditis example.
While the latter involves reflecting the subjective beliefs and preferences of the
DAi. The former task, carried by the MA, has to ensure compliance with
the acceptability criteria, or exceptionally prioritize arguments not validated by
the ACKB but validated, for example, by the CBRe. This is because MA’s
preference assignation determines whether the organ is deemed as viable or not
for a particular RAj .
The latter, subjective, preference assignation we leave here. MA’s argument
evaluation process is discussed in §3.3. In the following section we discuss the
many roles of the Argument Schemes and their associated Critical Questions.
3.2 ProCLAIM’s use of Argument Schemes and Critical
Questions
One influential informal logic based approach to argumentation is given by
Walton [30], in which arguments are viewed as instantiations of presumptive
argument schemes. Argument schemes can be regarded as reasoning patterns,
structures of inference, possibly non-monotonic and non-deductive, that enable
to identify and evaluate common types of arguments used in a particular do-
main. Associated to an argument scheme are critical questions that on the one
8Without argument B1.
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hand identify valid lines of reasoning that can further support the argument
instantiating the scheme and, on the other hand, identify the arguments that
attack this argument.
ProCLAIM’s use of argument schemes and their associated critical questions
(CQ) goes from defining the contextual deliberative scenario, to providing guid-
ance to the arguing agents in their reasoning. The MA relays on the schemes
in order to direct the collaborative decision making indicating the agents what
are their possible moves at each stage of the dialog. Also we show in §3.4, that
schemes play a crucial role in the CBRe reasoning cycle.
In §3.2.1 we define the Argumentation System for the agents’ deliberations,
or as we named it in §3.1 the Dialectical Argumentation System. In §3.2.2
we describe the role of the argument schemes as a protocol based exchange of
arguments among the agents. Finally, in §3.2.3 we discuss the advantages of the
natural language representation of the schemes in the ProCLAIM’s interaction
with the end users.
3.2.1 An Argumentation System for the Agents’ Deliberation
In the deliberative level, arguments submitted by the proponent agents must be
instantiations of argument schemes, and these argument schemes must belong to
a scheme repository managed by the MA. Thus, arguments in the deliberative
level are not constructions of rules and facts as in the reasoning level but are
filled templets. For instance, arguments such as A3 of example 1, and A4 of
example 2 :
A3: ({d o(d, lung), d p(d, s h), d o(D, lung) ∧ d p(D, s h) ⇒ contra(D, lung),
contra(D,O)⇒ ¬v(D,O)}, ¬v(d, lung))
A4: ({d o(d, kidney), d p(d, sve), d o(D,O)∧d p(D, sve)⇒ results r p(R, svi),
harmful(svi), d o(D,O)∧results r p(D,C)∧harmful(C)⇒ contra(D,O),
contra(D,O)⇒ ¬v(D,O)}, ¬v(d, lung))
That claim the non-viability of an organ based on the fact that the donor has
a contraindication; in the deliberative level they must be expressed through an
instantiation of the NVS1 scheme:
NVS1 Non-Viability scheme 1:
Donor D of organ O had condition C
And C is a contraindication for donating O
Therefore, organ O is non-viable.
Namely, NVS1(d, s h, lung) and NVS1(d, sve, kidney) would stand for A3 and
A4 respectively. We denote Schemei(x1, .., xn) as an instantiation of the scheme
Shemei, with x1, .., xn grounded and preserving the order in which the variables
appear in the scheme definition.
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Note, that although the reasoning behind the claims for non-viability are
different in A3 and A4, they both take an homogenous representation in the
deliberative level. Moreover, no matter how each agent’s internal mechanism is
designed and programmed, in order to deliberate they must be able to instanti-
ate these schemes appropriately. Thus, in the proponent agents’ reasoning level
we may find heterogeneity, which may be desirable, but in the deliberative level,
the proponent agents have to express their positions through a consensuated9 set
of reasoning patterns in order to ease the communication among them. Thus, in
the tradeoff between expressivity and control (as well as shared comprehension)
we decided for the latter. And we believe this decision is motivated by the type
of scenarios to which the ProCLAIM’s model is intended (see §4). We address
the expressivity issue in §3.2.3, until then, let us assume that the schemes are
expressive enough for our purpose. Namely, that every argument relevant for
the deliberation can be expressed by instantiating argument schemes and pos-
ing CQs that belong to the scheme repository. Now let us continue with the
definition of the Dialectical Argumentation System.
The Argument Schemes in the scheme repository are designed aiming to
preserve the main concepts of the arguments’ structure and the definition of
defeat given in the Reasoning Argumentation System. Namely, we can identify
in an argument instantiating a scheme, weak and strong literals and the negation
of a defeasible rules in the head of another defeasible rule. Also the definitions
of undercut defeat and rebut defeat are preserved, however, with an added
procedural flavor given by the CQ. This is because an argument can only be
attacked through CQs. To illustrate this, let us develop example 2, this time
however, as a dialog.
Example 3 Suppose the DAi offers a kidney of a donor d who died because of
a sve. We require from a dialog to start with the instantiation of the argument
scheme for viability VS, in which the donor, the offered organ and the potential
recipient are identified10:
VS Viability scheme:
Donor D of organ O
And no contraindications are known for donating organ O to recipient R
Therefore, organ O is viable.
Hence, the dialog starts with the argument A1 = VS(d, kidney, r). Let us sup-
pose this time that the DAi believes that the kidney is actually non-viable and
so he may want to attack argument A1. To VS is associated the CQ:
VS CQ1 Is there a contraindication C for donating organ O?
9As we show in §3.2.3 this set of reasoning patterns is dynamic. Namely, reasoning patterns
can be added, deleted or edited.
10This does not mean that their identity is revealed.
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Linked to this CQ is the NVS1 scheme that enables the DAi to pose argument
A2 =
NVS1(d, sve, kidney). Note that, whereas argument VS(d, kidney, r) is sup-
ported by the fact that no contraindication could be shown (i.e weak negation),
NVS1(d, sve, kidney) states that sve is a contraindication. Thus, following de-
finition 4 A2 undercut defeats A1 (see fig. 7).
Suppose that a RAj to which this organ is offered, believes the organ to
be viable. Thus, RAj may want to attack or challenge the fact that sve is a
contraindication for donating a kidney. Thus, RAj may use one of the CQ
associated to NVS1:
NVS1 CQ2 Is condition C a contraindication for transplanting organ O into
recipient R?
RAj may use this CQ, represented by A3, to challenge DAi’s argument for
non-viability A2. A challenge is a dialectical move that enables to pass the
burden of proof from one agent to another. From the argument graph point of
view, they are arguments defeating the argument which they challenge, until,
the challenge is met by the posing of a new argument. In this case, DAi has
to provide an argument that supports the fact that sve is a contraindication in
order to defend A2 from A3. Let us suppose that DAi believes sve to be a
contraindication because, if the kidney is transplanted, the recipient may end up
having a harmful infection ( svi). Thus, DAi can answer to RAi’s challenge, by
instantiating the scheme DDTS linked to the CQ NVS1 CQ2:
DDTS Donor Disease Transfer Contraindication Scheme:
When transplanting organ O from donor D with condition C1 to a recip-
ient R, R may end up having condition C2
And C2 is harmful
Therefore, C1 is a contraindication for transplanting O
Hence, DAi’s argument A4 = DDTS(kidney, d, sve, r, svi) defends A2 from the
challenge A3, posed by RAj. Now, associated to DDTS scheme is the CQ:
DDTS CQ1 Is there a course of action A that can prevent condition C2 on
recipient R?
And linked to DDTS CQ1 is argument scheme DCCAPS:
DCCAPS Donor Condition Course of Action Prevention Scheme:
Following course of action A on recipient R prevents donor D’s condition
C1 resulting in condition C2 on R
And A is intended
Therefore R will not result in having C2 as a consequence of D having C1.
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DDTS_CQ1
NVS1_CQ2
A3
NVS1_CQ2: Challenge
A4
DDTS(kidney,d,sve,r,svi)
A5
DCCAPS(penicilin,r,d,sve,svi)
NVS1_CQ2
A2
NVS1(d,sve,kidney)
A1
VS(d,kidney,r)
VS_CQ1
Figure 7: Argument Graph illustrating example in the absence of a preference
relation 3
Thus, RAj can submit argument A5 = DCCAPS(penicillin, r, d, sve, svi) that
attacks DAi’s argument A4. Now, A5’s claim is the negation of a defeasible
rule, ‘r will not result in having svi as a consequence of d having sve’, which is
one of A4’s assumptions, thus, again, following definition 4, in the absence of
a preference relation, A4 and A5 symmetrically rebut defeat each other.
This example illustrates that the underlying notions of argument and defeat
relation defined in the reasoning level are preserved in the deliberative level.
However, in the deliberative level, an agent cannot construct an argument from
facts and rules, but it has to instantiate an existing scheme. Also the use of
a CQ as a challenge is added in the deliberative level. A challenge may be
regarded as a change in the burden of proof, as used in the example, or as a way
to concatenate arguments. Namely, the DAi could have posed the arguments
A2, A3 and A4, using the challenge A3 as a bridge to support his argument A2
with argument A4 arguing why sve is a contraindication.
There is still another difference which we have not yet addressed. Not every
assumption can be attacked, nor every CQ can be used as a challenge. For
instance, agents are not allowed to attack or challenge the fact that the given
organ is in fact the offered organ. These aspects have more to do with the dialog
protocol than with the Argumentation System.
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3.2.2 A Protocol Based Exchange of Argument
At any stage of a dialog11 a new argument has to be posed through a CQ
associated to one of argument in the argument graph. Namely, the CQs identify
all the possible argument-related dialectical moves. This leads in a natural way
to define a protocol based exchange of arguments among the agents, based on the
argument schemes and their associated CQ. For example, the CQs associated
to the VS scheme, with which a dialog starts, identify all the valid lines of
reasoning for arguing over the viability of an offered organ:
VS CQ1: Does donor D has a Contraindication C1 for donating organ O?
VS CQ2: Does organ O has a Contraindication C2 for being donated?
VS CQ3: Does organ O matched recipient R?
VS CQ4: Are there expected Logistical Contraindications L?
VS CQ5: Is the wrong course of action A1 intended on donor D?
VS CQ6: Is the wrong course of action A2 intended on recipient R?
Note that no CQ questions whether O is in fact the offered organ, nor that R is
actually the potential recipient. Thus, not every possible logical move is a valid
dialectical move.
This notion of moving from one scheme instantiation to another through the
CQs is captured in example 3 and further illustrated in figure 8. As seen in the
example, to a CQ associated to an argument scheme AS are linked schemes that
if effectively instantiated can either attack an instantiation of AS or defend it
from the challenge posed by the CQ. In order to capture this idea, consider AS
and its associated set of critical questions AS CQ1,. . .,AS CQn. Each AS CQi
is represented by a tuple (Defend,Attack) where Defend and Attack are sets
of argument schemes. Suppose A is submitted as an argument instantiating
scheme AS. Then:
• AS CQi can be expressed as a challenge locution to A, in which case
some argument B instantiating an argument scheme in Defend must be
submitted to defend A (for instance a challenge to some assumption c
made by argument A, can be defended by an argument B that justifies c)
• AS CQi can be expressed as the locution of an argument B instantiating
a scheme AS2 ∈ Attack. B attacks A and B is then itself subject to
critical questioning in the same way as A.
Of course, if the set Attack is empty, AS CQi can only be expressed as a
challenge locution. On the other hand, if Defend is empty AS CQi can only
be expressed as the locution of an argument that attacks AS.
11Except for its starting and ending stage.
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S2CQ3 :  From Scheme S1, S1’s critical question CQ3 can lead the dialog to scheme S2
CQ2
:  S1’s CQ2 leads the dialog to schemes which are not in this graphS1
:  A Scheme from which the dialog can start
S1
S1
VS
NVS1
PAS
PACRS
RCACS
DDTS
CQ6
CQ1
CQ1 CQ2
DCAPS
RPCS
CQ2
CQ2
CQ3
CQ1
DGFS
CQ1
CQ2,3,4,5
CQ2
CQ2
CQ2
CQ1,2 CQ2
NDASCQ2
CQ1
CAPS
Figure 8: A fragment of the argument schemes and their relation via their asso-
ciated critical questions. The schemes not introduced in the examples enables,
for instance, to express that a patient has a certain condition due to some tests
results (PAS), or that a condition in the patient appears in his clinical record
(PACRS). These schemes also enable to express that a donor’s condition is a
contraindication because it may lead to a graft failure (DGFS), or that a certain
condition is not harmful given the recipients medical condition (RPCS). Finally,
RCACS captures the reasoning that a wrong course of action is intended on the
recipient (for example, administrating penicillin to a recipient allergic to that
antibiotic).
The tuple (Defend,Attack) linked to VS CQ1 is ({}, {[NV S1]}), thus an
agent cannot challenge the fact that no contraindications on D are known for
donating O. In example 3 the scheme NVS1 ∈ Attack of VS CQ1, is instantiated
to attack an instantiation of scheme VS. Now, NVS1 in turn has also associated
CQs:
NVS1 CQ1: Does donor D has condition C?
({[PAS]D, [PACRS]D}, {[PAS]D, [PACRS]D})
NVS1 CQ2: Is C a Contraindication for transplanting organ O into recipient
R?
({[DDTS], [GFS]}, {[NDAS], [UZS]R})
The subindexes attached to the schemes are sets of agents’ roles. These sets
indicate which are the agents’ role that can instantiate that particular scheme,
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in that stage of the dialog. In this case, these subindexes are R = {RA,MA}
and D = {DA,MA}. Schemes with no subindex can be instantiated by any
agent, namely MA, DAi and RAj . Hence, in this case, in order to claim that
C is not a contraindication, a DAi cannot instantiate the scheme UZS, that
captures the reasoning: –Given that the potential recipient R is in urgency-0
(precarious survival condition), C is not a contraindication for donating organ
O to recipient R– But this scheme can indeed be instantiated by a RAj . Simi-
larly, the RAj cannot instantiate any of the schemes indicating whether C is a
condition of D. Thus, if a DAi challenges an argument A instantiating NVS1
through NVS1 CQ1 he himself would have to instantiate either scheme PAS or
PACRS to defend A.
In [25] we propose the use of operators in the definition of the argument
schemes’ CQs. This enables to encode concepts such as reputation or commit-
ment into a scheme’s definition. However these notation is not mature enough
at this point as to be developed here.
Let us now discuss the role of the MA in directing the agents’ deliberation
and how we see schemes guiding the agents in constructing their arguments.
As the dialog evolves the MA indicates the deliberating agents which are
their possible dialectical moves by pointing them out the CQ associated to
the arguments that have already been submitted. From the software agents’
point of view12, this refers to receiving illocutions in which a grounded formula
F is questioned. Where F may be, for example, F =∼ contra(kidney, d) or
F = (d o(d, kidney)∧ d p(d, sve)⇒ results r p(r, svi)). Suppose the argument
under evaluation is A instantiating scheme S1 and the MA points out to an
agent a the CQ S1 CQk. The idea is that, if ∆a is this agent’s KB, and T is
his translator operator that translates a formula F into the agent’s knowledge
representation then, if F is not a weak literal:
1. If ∆a ` ¬T(F ) the agent may requestMA to send him the schemes in the
set Attack13 linked to S1 CQk. If that set is empty or the agent is unable
to instantiate any of the attacking schemes, the agent may challenge A
through S1 CQk, whenever this move is valid. Otherwise, if the agent is
able to instantiate one of the schemes in Attack, the agent may pose an
argument B attacking A.
2. If ∆a `∼ T(F ) the agent may challenge A1, if that is a valid move.
3. If ∆a ` T(F ) the agent may either request MA to explore other CQs,
or ask for the schemes in the set Defend linked to S1 CQk. If the agent
is able to instantiate one of these schemes, he may challenge A and sub-
sequently defend it with an argument instantiating one of the schemes in
Defend. If A has already been challenged through S1 CQk, then the agent
may directly proceed to defend it by instantiating a scheme in Defend.
12We address the human agent view point in §3.2.3
13The MA will only send the schemes intended for the agent’s role.
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If F is weak literal, such that F =∼ G, G being a strong literal, then only
points 1) and 3) are applicable, and should be 1) ∆a ` T(G) and 3) ∆a ` ¬T(G).
Our aim, is that when an agent requests a particular scheme, he receives
the scheme structure, in which the support and the claim are identified as well
as the relevant facts and rules relevant for its instantiation. This information
will facilitate the agents’ task of instantiating the schemes. Currently we are
formalizing the structure of the schemes in a way that this can be done, also
some prototyping tests has been carried out with the proposed formalizations.
We now provide an example that illustrated three issues. The first is that an
CQ can be used more than once. The second is that an agent may make more
than one move at a time, and the third issue refers to the fact, that the agents’
deliberation cannot, or should not, be formalized as a competing scenario, such
as a proponent-opponent dialog game, but rather as a collaborative decision
making:
Example 4 Suppose that the DAi offers for transplantation a lung of a donor
d who died because of a sve and had a smoking history of more than 30 packs
a year, but did not have COPD. On the one hand, the DAi believes that the
donor smoking history (s h) is not a contraindication given that the donor did
not have a COPD. But on the other hand, as in example 3, he believes sve to
be a contraindication.
Thus, the dialog may start with the instantiation of scheme VS as A1 =
VS(d, lung, r) and with the posing of argument A2 = NVS1(d, sve, lung) by
DAi
14. Agent RAj may submit two challenges and an argument for non-
viability: A3 and A4 challenging whether sve is a contraindication15 and whether
d actually had a sve16, respectively. Also the RAj may pose the argument A5
= NVS1(d, s h, lung).
In order for DAi to answer to A3 and attack A4 he may use the following
two schemes:
PAS Patient Property Affirmation Scheme:
Test S on Patient P gave result U
Therefore, P has condition C.
And
NDAS No disease associated with history scheme:
If donor D did not have the disease E that is a manifestation of condition
C
Then it is not the case that: if Donor D of organ O has condition C then
C is a contraindication for donating O
14∆DAi ` T (contra(d, lung)).
15∆RAj `∼ T (contra p(sve, lung)). Where contra p(C,O) stands for: condition C is a
contraindication for donating organ O.
16∆RAj `∼ T (d p(d, sve)). The fact that the RAj receives the data that the donor had
a sve doe not implies that the agent has to directly incorporate it into his beliefs.
27
DDTS_CQ1
NVS1_CQ1
NVS1_CQ2
A3
NVS1_CQ2: Challenge
A6
DDTS(lung,d,sve,r,svi)
A7
PAS(d, blood_cultive,sve_positive,sve)
A9
DCCAPS(penicilin,r,d,sve,svi)
NVS1_CQ1
NVS1_CQ2
A2
NVS1(d,sve,lung)
A1
VS(d,lung,r)
VS_CQ1
A4
NVS1_CQ1: Challenge
A5
NVS1(d,s_h,lung)
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VS_CQ1
NVS1_CQ2
Figure 9: Argument Graph illustrating example 4 in the absence of a preference
relation
We can now suppose the DAi poses arguments A6 = DDTS(lung, d, sve, r, svi),
A7 =
PAS(blood cultive, d, sve positive) to answer to RAj’s posed challenges, and A8
=
NDAS(d, copd, s h) to attack argument A4. And finally, RAj may pose argu-
ment A9 =
DCCAPS(penicillin, r, d, sve, svi)17.
In this example, the two agents pose reasons for the organ to be deemed,
both, viable and non-viable. In particular, there is no clear proponent or op-
ponent in the dialog. The agents simply express their beliefs, and whether one
agent is persuaded by the other, whether they agree a priory or they remain
having conflicting position, is correctly not one of ProCLAIM’s concerns.
It is worth mentioning that this formalization accounts for the possibility for
agents to exchange arguments in a three step process, as opposed to a dialog.
Namely, the DAi may construct his arguments supporting his beliefs, using
the CQs to concatenate arguments. These arguments may subsequently be
counterargued by the RAj and finally, the MA can precede to add his own
arguments and evaluate the resulting argument graph. Thus, the protocol’s
flexibility enables the application of ProCLAIM in both, scenarios in which
agent may enter into a dialog, or scenarios in which, for whatever circumstances,
it is not reasonable for the agents to maintain a dialog.
17∆RAj ` ¬T (d o(d, kidney) ∧ d p(d, sve)⇒ results r p(r, svi)).
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3.2.3 The End Users
In this subsection we briefly comment on the advantages of the use of argument
schemes and CQ in the interaction with the end users. These advantages are
mainly due to the readily representation of the schemes in natural language and
to the dialectical nature given by the CQ.
In our experience these properties have shown to be valuable in eliciting
knowledge form the experts, in this case, the medical doctors. The knowledge
embedded in the schemes is readily comprehended by the experts easing their
task in detecting misconceptions, proposing changes and adding new schemes
to the repository. Also, the CQs enables capturing in a natural dialectical way
the exceptions of the reasoning represented in a given scheme. Thus, in our
experience, going from one scheme to another through CQs did not involve any
overhead for the experts.
For these same reasons we believe that the schemes and their associated CQ
constitute an advanced starting point for an end user interface. The end users of
a system implementing the ProCLAIM model, can deliberate by constructing
and retrieving instantiated schemes. The MA will direct the deliberation as
described in §3.2.2 and the software agent, of the type presented in §3.1, can
support the end users by proposing scheme instantiations easing the end users’
task.
Moreover, we believe that in a running system implementing ProCLAIM,
the same users may easily edit the scheme repository whenever a new reasoning
has to be captured or an existing scheme has to be modified or deleted. Note
that, since the repository of schemes is managed by the central system, changes
to the schemes can be effected in the scheme repository obviating the need for
maintaining consistency amongst distributed repositories.
3.3 MA’s Argument Evaluation
MA’s evaluative role can be divided in two, evaluating the validity of the incom-
ing arguments, and determining which are the winning arguments, i.e. which
are the preferred arguments in Dung’s framework (see def. 6). As seen in ex-
amples 3 and 4, the latter task may involve assigning preference between the
arguments, and/or submitting additional arguments, as seen in example 2. In
both evaluative tasks, MA makes use of three knowledge resources: the GK,
the CBRe and the Argument Source Manager, which account for the ACKB,
CBRe and the Agents’ Reputation in our working scenario.
As arguments are submitted the MA has to check whether they constitute
valid arguments. Given that arguments have to be submitted following the
protocol based exchange of arguments, the task of the MA is to check whether
the schemes’ instantiations are valid.
• The ACKB encodes what are deemed valid arguments instantiating ar-
gument schemes. Thus, this knowledge resource will prevent the inclusion
of arguments such as NVS1(d, dark hair, pancreas) claiming the pancreas
to be non-viable because the donor has condition dark hair.
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Figure 10: ProCLAIM’s Architecture for the Transplant Scenario
• TheCBRemay indicate that while an instantiation of a scheme is deemed
non valid by the ACKB, there is an evidential basis (from recorded past
cases) that the instantiation is a valid use of the scheme. This only ac-
counts for an extension of MA’s vocabulary, the exceptionally accepted
argument may or may not be a strong argument.
• If an argument is neither validated by the ACKB or the CBRe, it may
well be that if the proponents agent has a sufficiently high reputation
(e.g., on all previous occasions the agent successfully transplanted organs
it deemed viable) then it’s argument may be deemed valid.
Once the arguments have been accepted as valid and their attacks defined,
the MA then applies Dung’s calculus of opposition to determine the acceptable
arguments (that is the winning arguments), in particular, to determine whether
arguments for non-viability or viability are winning arguments. This requires
assignation of preference between the arguments and possibly the posing of addi-
tional arguments, which theMA does by referring to the above three knowledge
resources:
• The ACKB encodes a preference relation (partial ordering) among the
criteria. This enables MA to assign relative strengths to the argument
schemes instantiations.
This reflects the fact that not all the acceptability criteria are of the same
nature. For example, while some criteria are suggestions (lungs of donors
with a smoking history of more than 30 packs a year should be discarded)
others are in fact legal obligations (HIV is an absolute contraindication
for being a donor in Spain [18]).
Also this knowledge resource is referred by the MA in order to construct
arguments. If in the example 4 none of the agents would have taken into
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account the donor’s smoking history in deliberating over his lung, theMA
would have posed the argument NSV1(d, s h, lung), which may then be
attacked by NDAS(d, copd, s h).
• The arguments’ relative strengths are then readjusted by theMA to reflect
the arguments’ evidential support derived from the CBRe. Supposing
two symmetrically defeating arguments A and B are being evaluated, if
there is sufficient evidence gathered from previous similar experiences
that indicate that A wins out B, A will be deemed preferred to B. Also,
the CBRe may pose additional arguments that where deemed relevant in
previous similar situations. We describe in more detail the CBRe tasks in
§3.4.
• The agents’ reputations also influences the arguments’ relative strengths.
MA may bias its decision favoring agents with good reputations. To
illustrate with the endocarditis example, suppose the RAj has a good
reputation. Also suppose that administrating penicillin to prevent sve
from being a contraindication is not a common procedure. Hence, it would
not be addressed in ACKB, nor would there be evidential records in the
CBRe in favor of or against treatment success. But, because of RAj ’s
good reputation, MA may prefer argument A9 over A6 (see fig. 9). This
will enable A9’s attack on A6 to succeed.
At the moment, the possible conflicts among assessments derived from the
three knowledge resources are resolved assigning a preference relation between
the resources: GK ≺ CBRe ≺ Argument Source Manager. Namely, assessments
derived form the Argument Source Manager (agents reputation) override those
derived from the CBRe, which in turn override those assessments derived from
the GK (ACKB). Nevertheless, we will explore other policies for resolving this
conflict for the transplant scenario as well as for other possible scenarios.
3.4 The Case-Based Reasoning Engine
Case-Based Reasoning involves solving a new problem based on the solutions of
similar past problems. In our case, both the target problem and the solutions are
argument graphs. The former is the graph of arguments under evaluation and
the latter are argument graphs used in previous experiences, and so retrieved
from the case base.
Graphs in the case base refer to previous resolved experiences in which the
offered organs were deemed, or shown to be, either viable or non-viable. Thus,
in resolved graphs there is a unique preferred extension, and so in particular,
symmetrical defeats between arguments are resolved. Note that the impasse
of having two arguments A and B mutually defeating each other can be re-
solved by prioritizing one argument over another, or by posing a third argu-
ment C that symmetrically defeats either A or B. In example 2 argument
B1 = ({H},¬plan action(r, penicillin)) resolves the impasse of the mutually
defeating argument A1 and A2 (see fig. 6b).
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Suppose DAi and RAj have submitted all the arguments that they believe
are relevant for determining the viability of an offered organ. Suppose as well
that in previous similar situations (donor’s, organ’s and recipient’s medical con-
ditions) other DAs and RAs have provided more arguments that have proved to
be relevant. It is reasonable to believe that these additional arguments used in
previous similar situations are also relevant for the evaluation of the current or-
gan’s viability. Thus, the CBRe not only intends to resolve symmetrical defeats
but it may also provide additional arguments.
Broadly, the idea is that given a new case, composed of the medical in-
formation together with the agents’ arguments which constitute an argument
graph, say G0 (of the type of fig. 9), the CBRe will return an argument graph
GR that subsumes G0 and such that, when there is sufficient evidence, bidi-
rectional arrows in G0 (symmetrical defeats) are substituted by unidirectional
arrows (asymmetrical defeats). However, it may not always be possible for the
CBRe to resolve symmetrical defeats in G0, i.e. substitute bidirectional arrows
by unidirectional ones. Namely, given A and B mutually defeating arguments
in G0, there may not always be sufficient evidence to decide whether A should
win out B or vice versa. Relating to example 4, there may or may not be suffi-
cient evidence as to decide whether penicillin can actually prevent a svi on the
recipient, i.e. whether argument A6 should win out A9 or vice versa (see fig 9).
In the following subsection we describe the case and argument graph repre-
sentation and in §3.4.2 we describe the CBRe reasoning cycle that enables the
resolution of a new argument graphs on the basis of previous experiences.
3.4.1 Case Description and Argument-Graph Representation
Each transplant experience constitutes a case. The textual medical informa-
tion describing this experience - the case description - along with the graph of
arguments submitted by the agents, capture the case’s features . In different
transplant experiences the arguments given by the agents may be the same,
i.e., different case descriptions may share the same argument graph of the type
illustrated in figure 4. Graphs in the CBRe contains nodes (arguments) sub-
mitted in the three phases described in §2.3.2, where phase 1 (pre-extraction)
arguments have a more presumptive nature, and phase 2 (post-extraction/pre-
transplantation) and 3 (post-transplantation) arguments are more conclusive,
or explanatory in nature, given that they are supported by factual evidence.
Each argument graph has an associated evidential support represented by a
tuple (F,K). F is 1,2 or 3, indicating which phase the case was resolved. Argu-
ment graphs resolved in phase 3 provide stronger evidence than those resolved
in phase 2 which provide stronger evidence than those resolved in phase 1. K
is the number of case descriptions that share the argument graph. Graphs with
biggerK provide stronger evidence. An argument graph has sufficient evidential
support if K is bigger than a given threshold (e.g. 5 cases)18.
18Aspects such as the evidential support of an argument graph or sufficient evidential sup-
port ; may suffer some modifications when the CBRe is applied in other scenarios.
32
Scenario:
   Donor’s characteristics: 
      Relevant data of the donor, such as
      his age, gender, blood type, cause 
     of death, viral infections, etc.
   Organ characteristics: 
      Specific information of the organ.
   Recipient characteristics: 
      Relevant data of the recipient,
      such as his age, gender, blood type,
      urgency level, etc.
   Logistical characteristics:
      Location of both donor and recipient, 
      the distance between the two location, 
      expected travel time, etc.
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      urgency level, etc.
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      Specific information of the organ.
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      such as his age, gender, blood type,
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      Location of both donor and recipient, 
      the distance between the two location, 
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Figure 11: Case and Argument Graph Representation
Although, for readability purposes, we depict graphs as trees, with the argu-
ment for viability as the root, an argument may attack more than one argument
(a child can have two parents). The edges of the argument graphs denote attacks
and defeats between arguments.
As described in §3.2.1, it may be that the argument graph G0 of a new
case may have nodes connected by bi-directional links, i.e., arguments A and B
symmetrically defeating each other. One of the CBRe tasks is to decide, on the
basis of argument graphs representing past cases, whether A defeats B or vice
versa, and thus help establish whether the organ being decided over in the new
case is viable or not. In the next subsection we describe the CBRe’s reasoning
cycle [1]. That is, the four processes: retrieve, reuse, revise and retain, that
enable CBRe to carry out its task.
3.4.2 The CBRe Reasoning Cycle
Retrieval: We describe in some detail the first reasoning process in which,
given a target problem (the argument graph of the new case), the relevant cases
for solving it are retrieved from the memory. The relevant cases (graphs) are
those that apply to the new situation and have sufficient evidential support.
The memory from which the relevant argument graphs are retrieved is a set M
of directed graphs whose nodes are instantiated argument schemes or critical
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questions, and whose edges represent attacks or defeats between arguments.
Also, for every graph Gi ∈ M the scheme for viability is in Gi. In order to
facilitate the retrieval process, the memory space is organized on the basis of
three partial orderings:
Definition 8 Let S and S′ be sets of graphs. Let pS be a projection from S
to S′, where S′ is equal to S except that the nodes in S′’s graphs are argument
schemes or critical questions with no instantiation and the edges in S′’s graphs
are not directed. We say that G ¹S F , where G,F ∈ S, if and only if the graph
pS(G) is subsumed by pS(F ).
Given a new target graph G0, the CBRe first identifies those graphs in its
memoryM that structurally resemble G019, i.e., the set {G1, . . . , Gn} such that
for i = 1 . . . n, G0 ¹S Gi, where from hereon we write S to denote M ∪ {G0}.
The instantiation of schemes in Gi may differ from the instantiations in G0. We
wish to retrieve only those Gi whose instantiations are related to that of G0 as
determined by an ontological hierarchy of instantiating terms.
Definition 9 Let O be the ontology whose terms instantiate the argument schemes
of graphs in S, where O is expressed as an ordering ≺ on terms, and ≺ is in-
terpreted as ‘more specific than’ ( e.g. svi ≺ bacterial infection ≺ infection)
We are only interested in those Gi related to G0, where the degree of similarity,
or the distance between them, falls below a given threshold. To evaluate this,
we use the distance between terms in O, denoted as δO (e.g., δO(infection, svi)
= 2), to determine a distance δsch between scheme instantiations, and so a
distance between graphs.
Definition 10 Let G,F ∈ S such that G =S F and sch1 . . . schm are the nodes
of both G and F . Then the distance δ(G,F ) between G and F is given by
maxmj=1(δsch(schj(x1, .., xn) , schj(y1, .., yn))), where
δsch(schj(x1, .., xn), schj(y1, .., yn)) = maxni=1(δO(xi, yi))
We then state a threshold k such that the CBRe retains only those Gi such that
δ(G0, Gi)< k. In general the identity of the donors and recipients involved in the
experiences are not relevant for comparing argument graphs, thus δO(d, d′) =
δO(r, r′) = 0 for every two donors d and d′ and for every two recipients r and r′.
To summarize, given a target graph G0, CBRe retrieves the set R1 = {G1...Gn}
such that for i = 1...n, G ¹Dk Gi, where ¹Dk is defined as follows:
Definition 11 Let G,F ∈ S such that for some sub-graph H of F , G =S H
(hence G ¹S F ). Then, G ¹Dk F if δ(G,H) < k.
From R1, the CBRe excludes the graphs that have arguments that are not
applicable in the situation represented by the target graph. For example, a graph
19Note that since all the graphs have the argument for viability as a singular node, comparing
the structure of these graphs is not computationally demanding.
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in R1 with an argument that assumes property X on the donor, not being the
case in the target problem. From the resulting set R2, the CBRe selects graphs
with sufficient evidential support (see S3.4.1), resulting in R3. At this stage
(step 4 of figure 12), each Gi ∈ R3 is an argument graph that is applicable to
the new case’s situation, taking into account all the arguments submitted by
the agents, and such that it has sufficient evidential support. Therefore, each
argument graph in R3 is relevant.
Reusing: The aim of this process is to map R3 to a solution for the target
graph G0. All the argument graphs in R3 are merged into a single graph GR
such that it contains all the arguments in all graphs in R3, and therefore in
G0 (step 5 of fig. 12), i.e. GR will be the minimal argument graph such that
Gi ¹Dk GR, Gi ∈ R3. Note that in merging the graphs it may be the case that
there are G1, G2 ∈ R3 such that an argument A asymmetrically defeats B in G1
but B asymmetrically defeats A in G2. We thus must decide the direction of the
defeat (the edge direction) in GR. Recalling the mutually defeating arguments
A6 and A6 in the target graph shown in fig. 9), this amounts to deciding which
argument asymmetrically defeats the other given the previous graphs G1 and
G2 (where A6 = A and A9 = B).
New Case
Case 
Base
New Case’s
SITUATION
Retrieve the  argument graphs that
subsume the new case’s argument graph
Filter the argument graphs that have arguments 
that cannot be used in the new case’s situation
Filter the Argument graphs that do not
have sufficient evidentil support
Mapping the 
retrieved argument
graphs
1) 2) 3)
4)
5)
The proposed argument graph contains the
arguments used in the relevant  argument 
graphs (step 3) that have sufficient 
evidential support (step 4). When there is 
enough evidence, CBRe resolves mutual 
attacks between arguments.
Evidential Support
Dk
Figure 12: The Retrieval Process from step 1 until 4. The Reuse Process, step
5
Suppose that for each edge connecting arguments A and B of Gi ∈ R3
we associate the evidential support of Gi, writing ES(Gi, A,B) to denote the
evidential support (F,K) if A asymmetrically defeats B, else if A and B are
connected by a bi-directional edge (they mutually attack) then ES(Gi, A,B)
and ES(Gi, B,A) both take the value (0, 0). Now, for every two connected
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arguments A,B in GR, if maxGi∈R3(ES(Gi, A,B)) is sufficiently greater
20 than
maxGi∈R3(ES(Gi, B,A)), then the edge in GR will go from A to B indicating
that A defeats B. Otherwise, A and B will remain connected by a bi-directional
edge in GR indicating a mutual defeat.
Thus, GR is the CBRe’s proposed solution, where, as described above, evi-
dential supports are used to determine defeats and so a winning argument for
viable or non-viable. However, GR can also decide the issue of viability or non-
viability given additional arguments in GR that are not in G0. Recall that G0
will be a graph constructed from arguments submitted in phase 1, whereas GR
may contain arguments submitted in phases 2 and 3. As described at the end
of §2.3.2, phase 2 arguments in GR may provide conclusive evidence supporting
a final decision for non-viability. Whereas phase 3 arguments may provide con-
clusive evidence supporting a final decision for non-viability or viability (e.g.,
arguments describing post-transplant procedures that unsuccessfully, respec-
tively successfully, dealt with post-transplant complications). To summarize,
GR provides: 1) evidential support to determine defeats amongst arguments in
G0 and so decide viability; 2) new arguments for deciding viability; 3) guidance
to the recipient agent for post-transplant management of patients.
R3
A1
A2
A3
A1
A2
A3
A1
A2
A3
(3,18)* (1,25)G GR
A2 = NVS1(d,s_h,lung) 
A1 = VS(d,lung,r) 
A3 = NDAS(d,copd,s_h)  
A4: Argument representing the reason for graft failure result
(F,K)*: Graph’s evidential support
G’R
A1
A2
A3
A4
A1
A2
A3
Case 
Base
Retrieve Reuse Revise Retain
Figure 13: Smoking history example illustrating the CBRe reasoning cycle
Revising: The solution GR must be tested in the real world, and if neces-
sary, revised. This is achieved by requiring the agents to continue submitting
arguments to GR until the transplant experience ends. For example, if in the
smoking history example 1 the lung is deemed viable in GR (see fig.13) but there
is a graft failure the reasons for the failure will be submit as new argument A4
that will reinstate the argument for non-viability of the lung. The resulting
updated argument graph G′R will then be stored in the case base.
Retain: The aim is to store the possibly updated G′R as a new graph in the
20The definition of ‘sufficiently greater’ is a matter of choice. For example, we can say that
(F1,K1) is sufficiently greater than (F2,K2) if : a)F1 > F2, or b) F1 = F2 and F1 > 1, F2
> 1, and K1 ∗ 0.6 > K2.
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memory. Hence, when a transplant experience finishes, in either of the three
phases, the new case description describing this experience is retained by the
CBRe. If there already exists an argument graph G in the memory such that
G′R =Dk G, then the case description is associated with G increasing G’s ev-
idential support. Otherwise, G′R is added to the case base and the new case
description is associated with it.
3.4.3 Revising and Discovering
Another main task of the CBRe is to trigger an update on the ACKB when
there is evidence that there is an argument (criterion) that is rejected (resp.
accepted) or unknown by the ACBK that should be accepted (resp. rejected).
We have just shown how the CBRe can evaluate argument graphs on the basis
of their evidential support. However, from the CBRe’s reasoning cycle, as just
defined, it cannot be concluded whether a criterion, represented by an argument
A, should be accepted or rejected on its own, but only contextualized by a graph
containing A. For example, the argument NDAS(d, copd, s h) representing the
criterion Ccopd –Smoking history is not a contraindication if the donor did not
have a COPD– may be found in many different graphs of the case base, some-
times defeated and sometimes undefeated; moreover, sometimes the argument
for viability would be defeated and sometimes undefeated. An evidence that the
criterion Ccopd should be accepted by the ACKB, supposing it is not already
accept it, would be that a number of cases provide sufficient evidence for con-
cluding that there is no significant difference in the success of implantations of
lungs of donors with smoking history and no COPD than those of donors with
no smoking history. On the other hand, if evidence shows that a significant dif-
ference exists, indicating that the absence of COPD does not prevents smoking
history from being a contraindication, the ACKB will be revised as to reject
arguments that assume the criterion Ccopd.
This idea is not yet formalized and thus, remains to be done. Also, in our
work plan, is the formalization of the ACKB revision, e.g. how to incorporate
the criterion Ccopd into the KB.
Finally, another future line of work is the use of the case base for searching
patterns in order to propose new arguments, i.e. to propose new instantiations
of argument schemes, e.g. relating a donor condition X with unsuccessful trans-
plants and thus proposing the argument NVS1(d,X, organ), and thus, proposing
a new criterion to be included into the ACKB.
3.5 ProCLAIM’s Scope of Applicability
The ProCLAIM’s application in the transplant scenario shows the practical
value of the proposed model. However, we believe that the transplant scenario
is only one of the many scenarios in which the application of the model can prove
to be useful. Therefore, our intention is to present ProCLAIM as a more generic
model that can satisfactorily be applied in diverse types of scenarios. In order
to do so, however, we must first identify ProCLAIM’s scope of applicability.
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Despite the fact that at this stage our understanding of the proposed model
is strongly related to the transplant scenario, we intend to identify the scenarios’
properties that allows a satisfactory use of ProCLAIM. In defining the scenarios
in which the model can be applied, we do not address the scenarios to which
ProCLAIM can be applied with some minor changes, such as using less specific
schemes or obviating the KB revision. Thus, we only consider the scenarios in
which the model can be applied in its full sense.
Maybe the most obvious requirement for the scenarios is that the decisions
and arguments for justifying the acceptance or rejection of the decisions are
constraint to a well defined close context. This is due to the fact that the model
requires defining a set of highly specific schemes and CQs capable of capturing
most of the agents’ arguments relevant for the deliberations. As noted in §3.2.3,
the schemes in the repository can be changed and new schemes can be added.
However this would be done off-line.
Another requirement for the application of ProCLAIM is that it must be
possible for the results of the undertaken decisions to be unambiguously evalu-
ated. Namely, the agents’ values, preferences or positions should not influence,
substantially, the valuation of the results of the decisions. Otherwise, the no-
tion of evidence related to the CBRe evaluation takes a different sense from the
one we assume here and, to our belief, much more complex to handle. Thus,
we believe that in most scenarios in which the decisions are, for example, of
legal, economical or political nature (assuming they can fulfill the first require-
ment) are not likely to be good candidates for the application of ProCLAIM as
proposed here.
The scenarios should have an account of the existing guidelines to which
decisions should comply. Nonetheless, these ‘guidelines’ may not all be explicitly
known a priory or well integrated with the regulations related to the domain. In
which case, ProCLAIM’s initial role will be of acquiring knowledge. Namely, the
GK will start with a reduced number of guidelines, and as the system experiences
argued decision processes, the CBRe will trigger revisions on the GK that may
involve adding new guidelines or editing existing ones. Thus, in this situation,
the proponent agents act as experts that construct the GK via the CBRe. It is
reasonable to consider that initially theMA will consider most of the submitted
arguments as valid21 (relaying on the proponent agents’ judgement) but, as the
system learns from experience, the evidence associated to the arguments and
the GK knowledge component may play a more significant role in the argument
evaluation.
In our view, the scenarios to which ProCLAIM appears to be more suitable
are those involving safety-critical decision making. Such as in the environmental
or medical domain. In these scenarios the application of the proposed model
may not only be possible but also, and mainly, it appears to bear a valuable
21In order to resolve symmetrical defeats, theMA should refer to other policies that depend
on the context of application. For example, in the transplant scenario, if, after the use of the
three knowledge resources, theMA is not able to conclude which are the preferred arguments,
the MA will allow the RA to resolve, according to his judgement, the unresolved mutual
defeats.
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practical contribution.
A next step in identifying the ProCLAIM’s scope of applicability is to analyze
the proposed model’s use in other scenarios different from the one presented here.
In particular, our intention is to test ProCLAIM’s applicability as an extension
to the DAI-DEPUR+ system [6, 5], a decision support systems for Wastewater
Treatment Plants.
Wastewater Treatment Plants (WWTP) are facilities with a series of tanks,
screens, filters, and other processes used to clean wastewater before it is returned
to the environment. The main goal of a WWTP, thus, is to reduce the pollution
level of the wastewater by removing, within the possible measure, the ‘strange’
compounds of the inflow water before discharging it into the environment.
Figure 14: DAI-DEPUR+ Knowledge Management Architecture
The management of a WWTP involves several complex processes, composed
by several operational units and influenced by many factors that cannot be
controlled, e.g. water temperature, flow variations, peaks, toxic loading, etc.
Furthermore, the domain is ill-structured; there is a lack of understanding of
the true mechanisms of the biochemical processes involved in WWTPs, and the
relationships among different phenomena, which characterize the system, are
not yet fully understood. Finally, WWTPs have to accommodate to a number
of guidelines which main concern is control the level of the WWTPs’ allowed
pollution.
The DAI-DEPUR+ decision support system is designed as a distributed
and integrated supervisory multi-level agent-based system for WWTP oper-
39
ation. The system’s knowledge management involves three reasoning levels:
data gathering and interpretation, diagnosis and decision support (see fig. 14).
In the decision support reasoning level an Environmental / Health Regulations
knowledge resource is assumed with the aim of supporting the end users in their
decision making. However, this knowledge resource is defined as textual doc-
umentation to which the operators may refer to. Thus, no explicit support is
provided for the end users in the integration of the existing guidelines and their
decision making. We believe that this integration can be done by extending the
DAI-DEPUR+ so as to support the ProCLAIM model in the following way:
the model’s GK knowledge resource can be instantiated by the Environmental
/ Health Regulations component. The proponent agents will be the WWTP
operators, an thus in this case only one agent will enter in a deliberation with
the MA. Finally, the Argument Source Manager will deal with the operators’
hierarchy within the WWTP, thus, the operators’ role (see fig. 15).
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EHR: Environmental / Health Regulations
CBRe: Case-Based Reasoning Engine
Decision
Aa
rg
u
m
e
n
ts
 
e
va
lu
a
tio
n
WWTP Operator Agent 
MA Mediator Agent
Argument Scheme
Repository
DeliberationOpA CBRe
EHR
Operator Agent
Role
OpA
R
e
visio
n
Figure 15: ProCLAIM’s Architecture for the WWTP scenario
Operators of a WWTP must be aware of the effect their decisions and actions
have in the plant’s activity so that it complies with the exiting guidelines and
regulations. In spite of that, our initial research leads us to believe that the de-
gree to which the environmental regulations are intertwined with the operators
guidelines and policies are somewhat less explicit than those we encounter in
the transplant scenario (i.e. the human organ acceptability criteria). This leads
us to believe that, in this scenario, the ProCLAIM model’s initial role would
be of knowledge acquisition. Namely, through the gathering of experiences ar-
gued by the operators, the CBRe would be fed with cases that will eventually
updates the GK, i.e. the Environmental / Health Regulations component22.
Thus, in that way, DAI-DEPUR+ extended with ProCLAIM, can be used to
22Note that this revision accounts for changes in the WWTP internal regulations, namely,
the environmental legislation are not questioned.
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build a corpus of ‘Best Practice’ that integrates the environmental guidelines
knowledge, the WWTP regulations and the operators’ knowledge acquired along
their experience.
4 Conclusions
In this report we presented ProCLAIM, a model in an advanced stage of formal-
ization intended for monitoring agents’ decisions in safety-critical environments
and at the same time, intended for revising the established guidelines to which
the agents’ decisions have to comply. We have seen that this setting is particu-
larly interesting when applied to safety-related environments where there usually
exist a set of guidelines and wrong decisions must be prevented, but nonetheless,
there are circumstances in which decisions that violate these guidelines should
exceptionally be accepted. Furthermore, in these scenarios there is a strong
motivation for revising the GK, in particular when there is evidential basis as
we to do so.
Let us take the transplant scenario. On the one hand, the human organ ac-
ceptability criteria identifies what are organs that should not be transplanted,
but at the same time, organs which are not deemed non-viable by these criteria
must be considered for transplantation. Namely, if a transplant unit (a RAj)
decides not to transplant an offered organ deemed viable by these criteria, this
team will be penalized by prioritizing other transplant units in the following or-
gan allocation process [18]. Thus, these criteria not only prevents the hazardous
use of non-viable organs, but it also promotes the use of what are deemed viable
organs. Therefore, revisions on the ACKB will, on the one hand, prevent the
use of organs which condition has shown to be contraindicative for their trans-
plantation, and on the other hand, they will involve promoting the acceptance
of organs which conditions were previously believed to be contraindications but
empirical experience have shown that organs with such conditions are in fact
viable.
In [14] Lumbrera analyzes the implications of the extension of the current
human organ acceptability criteria regarding the acceptance of organs from
donors infected by HCV or HBV (Hepatitis B Virus) for the transplantation
of their organs into recipients carriers of the same viruses. A broad estimation
showed that more that 15% of the detected potential donors in Spain23 are
carriers of one of theses viruses, and thus the current criteria suggest to discard
their organs. Lubrera argues that these organs should and could effectively be
transplanted, given that a large number of the potential recipients (currently
about 5000 in Spain [18]) are carriers of one of these viruses and it has been
showed that this practice is relatively safe. Taking into account that in 2005 a
total of 3828 transplant operation were practiced in Spain [18], even an increase
of only 5% in the number of transplantation24 would involve almost 200 more
23In other countries these numbers may arrive to more than 50% of the detected donors.
24The increment would be lower than the 15% as, on the one hand, there are already some
medical doctors following these extended criteria and, on the other hand, organs from donors
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transplants, thus, possibly the saving of 200 lives a year only in Spain and only
taking into account the extension of the current acceptability criteria involving
donors infected with HCV or HBV25.
Empirical evidence are the main reason for proposing revisions in the accept-
ability criteria. In fact, modifications proposed with little evidential support are
usually controversial. Such is the case, for example, of the approval of the new
legislation in Illinois (USA) in which organs from HIV-positive donors can now
be transplanted to HIV-positive recipients [16]. This decision is based on the
thesis that if organs of HIV-positive donors are transplanted, the recipients of
these organs will be infected with HIV. Hence, if the recipient already carries
that virus, the transplant can effectively be carried out. In [16] it is argued
that, not only there is little evidence to conclude that this procedure is safe, but
that the little evidence that exists supports the believe that this practice may
lead to sever complication in the recipients regarding the progress of their HIV
infection. Nevertheless, in [16], the final conclusion is not that HIV-positive to
HIV-positive organ transplantation are doomed to be unsuccessful, but, that
prior to approving such legislations, much more empirical evidence must be
collected.
Our belief is that this example in the medical domain can be extended to
other safety-related scenarios, therefore, motivating our decision to only allow
revisions to the GK through the CBRe. i.e. to only update the guidelines
when there is empirical evidence to do so. Furthermore, we believe that this
also motivates our decision to clearly separate the proponent agents’ reasoning
level and the deliberative level. Thus, on the one hand, allowing the proponent
agents to reason, for example, by combining rules and facts given by the agent’s
developers, but, on the other hand, to constraint the argument-based deliber-
ation to instantiation of argument schemes and CQ of the systems’ Argument
Scheme Repository. This is due to the fact that we believe thatMA should only
be persuaded to exceptionally accept decisions not validated by the GK when
there is evidential basis to do so, or because the source from where the decision
is proposed is trustful. Namely, MA should not be persuaded by a wise manip-
ulation of rules and facts, which may lead to questionable results. Thus, we do
not regard the limitation of the agents’ expressivity in the deliberative level as
limitation of ProCLAIM , specially when considering the scenarios to which it
is intended. Nevertheless, as pointed out in §3.2.3, when a new reasoning must
be captured, the Argument Scheme Repository can easily be updated.
In formalizing ProCLAIM, we have taken a argument-based approach. More
specifically, argument schemes and CQs are core elements of the model. In our
experience, argumentation is proving to be a good choice for addressing the
problem we attempt to solve with ProCLAIM. Schemes are suitable for a quali-
tative exchange of, possibly conflicting, information. Also, as being arguments,
they can readily be framed into Dung’s calculus of opposition which provides
the setting for evaluating the preferred arguments. In our practice we have
with HCV or HVB are occasionally transplanted to recipients in precarious survival condition.
25Lumbrera’s analyzes in particular those donors that are Anti-HBc positive (Hepatitis B
Core Antigen).
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found little difficulties in using schemes for capturing the existing human organ
acceptability criteria. Also the schemes and their associated CQ, have provided
a useful means for eliciting from the medical doctors the required knowledge
for arguing over the viability of organs for transplantation. Finally, argument
graphs as used in the CBRe, are a promising mean for the comparison of previ-
ous experiences and eventually revising the GK. Assuming the proponent agents
are expertise their posed arguments highlight what from the point of view of
the expertise are the most relevant facts, or factors, for evaluating the case.
Therefore, if for previous experiences other proponent agents, thus expertise,
have posed the similar arguments (see the retrieval process in §3.4.2), it seams
reasonable to deem these cases as similar. Moreover, as we intend to show in
the near future, that these argument graphs will allow to revise the GK.
An essential aspect of our approach in formalizing ProCLAIM, is the speci-
ficity of the schemes’ definition. Namely, the argument scheme repository defines
a highly specific and context dependent set of schemes tailored to each scenario
to which the model is to be applied. This involves an obvious overhead for
the developers intending to apply ProCLAIM in a new scenario. Although we
intend to provide a methodology that would ease this task, the repository will
still have to be fully developed from scratch. Our motivations for this approach
are:
1. The construction of the repository has resulted in a helpful mean for a
better understanding of the agents’ deliberative context, essential for a
proper application of the model. This is because, schemes are not only a
mean for structuring the arguments, but they also embed a great deal of
the contextual knowledge of the scenarios.
2. It was easier to elicit the required knowledge from the medical doctors
through very specific and defeasible rules, rather than through more gen-
eral and context independent rules such as for example, the schemes pro-
posed by Atkinson et al. in [2], e.g. –In the Current Circumstances R
we should perform Action A to achieve New Circumstances S which will
realize some goal G which will promote some value V –. We believe, and
intend to test it, that this experience can be extended to other scenarios,
such as the WWTP scenario.
3. The specificity of the argument schemes enables the definition of an en-
vironment in which autonomous software agents can actively participate
in the exchange of qualitative information in domains as complex and
sensible as the transplant scenario. Moreover, the schemes’ specificity
enables not only the MA’s argument evaluation task by referring to the
GK knowledge resource, but also for the argument graphs to be evalu-
ated on the basis of previous experiences and furthermore, to eventually
revise the GK. The specificity of the schemes is of main relevance for the
CBRe reasoning cycle. We believe that if schemes are defined as more
generic and more expressivity is allowed, such as in [2], [30], [10] or [22],
the argument graph comparison becomes more complex, from both the
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computational and the design point of view. This is due to the fact that
the knowledge embedded in the more specific schemes reduces the degree
of interpretation required in the argument graphs comparison.
Therefore, we believe that our decision to focus on the more practical aspects
of ProCLAIM and thus, to explore its full application in the transplant scenario
and subsequently in the WWTP scenario before directly addressing the more
general ProCLAIM has proved to be successful, both in the practical and in the
theoretical field.
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